The patent-for-sale scheme ensnaring Indian academics by Anirban Mahapatra

[Dr. U. Pramanathan]

The patent-for-sale scheme ensnaring Indian academics by Anirban Mahapatra

Source: https://gyandemic.substack.com/p/the-patent-for-sale-scheme-ensnaring

A bombshell investigation finds that many Indian academics are buying fake designs from fraudulent companies to pad their credentials and boost their careers.

I want to lay down the facts which I’ve also presented in my column today in Hindustan Times.

Late last November, a strange invention appeared in the UK government's design registry: an "Artificial Intelligence Powered Skin Cancer Inspection Device." The accompanying illustration was striking—a 3D rendering of a Glock pistol, modified with a small screen and USB ports.

This wasn't a prank.

Within days, this implausible medical "breakthrough" was officially registered, listing several Indian academics as its inventors.

It was just one example among thousands in an elaborate scheme uncovered by researchers and published in February in the International Journal for Educational Integrity.

A network of companies has been selling spots on UK design registrations to academics who need patents for career advancement, exploiting gaps between academic evaluation systems and intellectual property laws to manufacture credentials on an industrial scale.

The researchers first stumbled upon this scheme in late 2022 while monitoring Facebook and WhatsApp groups where companies sell fraudulent academic services. These spaces are already known for offering ghostwritten PhD theses, fake conference presentations, and authorship slots on scientific papers.

Among these familiar offerings appeared a new product: "UK design patents" with inventorship slots for sale. The firms running these operations openly presented them as a shortcut to academic recognition.

The advertisements are brazen, listing design titles, processing times (under two weeks), and tiered pricing ("Applicant 1 + Inventor: ₹4,000, Applicant 2 + Inventor: ₹3,500").

But these aren't patents. They are design registrations, which protect product appearances without the rigorous scrutiny for technical innovation and novelty required for patent approval.

The scheme exploits a simple loophole: India's University Grants Commission awards more points toward promotion for international patents than for published research papers. A patent granted outside India earns 10 points toward career advancement, while publishing in a peer-reviewed journal earns just 8.

Patents also boost institutional rankings through metrics like the National Institutional Ranking Framework. But there's apparently no verification whether a claimed patent is actually a patent or just a design registration.

The companies saw a lucrative opportunity. Buy a UK design registration for around ₹5,000, sell multiple inventor spots at a markup, and process it within days instead of the years required for genuine patents.

Unlike utility patents, which require extensive documentation, UK design registrations process in about 11 days. Since the UK Intellectual Property Office doesn't check submissions for novelty or technical merit, companies can file nearly anything—original designs, crude renderings, or stolen models—and quickly obtain official registration numbers.

At least eight firms have pumped more than 3,000 registrations into the UK system (representing 3.3% of all filings in two years). One firm alone recycled identical images in 28% of its submissions.

A "smart shoe for the visually impaired" was inexplicably covered in USB ports. A supposed AI-powered garbage bin is represented by a crude sketch. The same computer model appears five times as different "revolutionary" devices.

Many designs are simply taken from public repositories and given new, technical-sounding names stuffed with "AI" and "internet of things" catchphrases. The products range from the absurd to the outright stolen.

The scheme exploits a regulatory blind spot.

The UK Intellectual Property Office considers design rights legitimately tradeable assets and won't comment on other countries' academic policies. Indian institutions rarely verify patent claims. Neither side can tackle the problem alone.

Unlike retractable journal papers or conference proceedings, these are permanent government records.

They provide official documentation of innovation where none exists, clog the registry for legitimate innovators, and leave participating academics vulnerable to blackmail—much like those who buy fake degrees from diploma mills.

Academics who purchase these fraudulent patents expose themselves to potential extortion from the very companies that supplied them with fake credentials.

This practice thrives within India's complex research ecosystem.

While the country's premier institutions, such as the Indian Institutes of Technology, Indian Institute of Science, and Indian Institutes of Science Education and Research produce world-class research across multiple disciplines, pressure to meet research metrics in many smaller colleges and universities creates an environment where shortcuts become attractive.

This pressure is intensified by the growing influence of rankings and performance-based funding.

What we're seeing is a collision between two broken systems: the business of academic fraud and the low-barrier nature of certain intellectual property protections.

Each approved design reinforces an illusion of achievement that benefits companies selling credentials and academics seeking advancement while undermining both academic integrity and intellectual property systems. This problem is not unique to India. Other countries have similar systems that reward faculty members for accumulating patents and publications with little substantive review.

The solution requires more than exposing bad actors. Academic institutions need better verification of patent claims and reconsideration of how intellectual property counts toward promotion.

Intellectual property offices could introduce safeguards against mass registration abuse, such as flagging repeated image use or suspicious numbers of co-applicants.

But the broader challenge remains.

As long as institutions prioritize counting metrics over evaluating actual contributions, these schemes will keep evolving because the financial and academic incentives to exploit the system will be too profitable for some to resist.

Wherever incentives exist without meaningful oversight, opportunistic actors will find ways to exploit them.

The question isn't whether such exploitation will occur, but where it will surface next. The future of academic integrity depends on recognizing this reality.

As we continue to follow this story, it's worth reflecting on what happens when achievement becomes a matter of metrics rather than merit. When we place quantity over quality, we shouldn't be surprised when the system produces exactly what we've incentivized.

I welcome your thoughts on this issue. Have you witnessed similar CV/resume padding in your field? How do we balance measurable metrics with meaningful evaluation?

Until next time,